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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1986, the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and
Liability Act (hereinafter referred to as "CERCLA")2 was amended to include,
among other things, a provision for nationwide service of process.3 This
provision greatly increased the choice of federal forums in which to sue
defendants in CERCLA cases. 4 Most federal courts hearing a case brought
under a federal statute (like the amended CERCLA) which provides for
national service of process, test the constitutionality of personal jurisdiction
over defendants by measuring their contacts with the United States as a whole
rather than the forum state.5 In Chatham v. Brown, the court broke from this line
of thinking and analyzed the case using a traditional constitutional Due Process
analysis. 6 Rather than presupposing personal jurisdiction over the
defendant(s) based upon the fact that the defendant(s) had contact with the
United States, the court stated that the plaintiff had to establish a prima facie
case of personal jurisdiction prior to the court exercising jurisdiction over a
defendant that was not a resident of the forum state.7 Although the Chatham
court ultimately held that it had personal jurisdiction over the defendants, the
analysis it used may be a harbinger of things to come. That is to say, the
constitutional analysis in Chatham could easily be used to restrict the exercise
of personal jurisdiction in CERCLA cases.
This note analyzes the basis of the court's reasoning, the gaps in the court's
logic, and the implications of the decision for future CERCLA cases. Section I
explains the facts of the Chatham case. Section II discusses CERCLA by first
giving an overview of the statute's liability scheme and then specifically
applying CERCLA liability to the Chatham case. Section III analyzes jurisdiction
by offering a brief overview of the law and applying that law to Chatham.8
2 CERCLA was passed in 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq. CERCLA was amended by
the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 ("SARA"), Pub.L.No.
99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986). The Act is commonly referred to as "Superfund" in relation
to the multimillion dollar tax-based trust fund that was established for hazardous waste
removals and remedial actions.
342 U.S.C. § 9613(e) (stating: "In any action by the United States under this chapter,
process may be served in any district where the defendant is found, resides, transacts
business, or has appointed an agent for the service of process.").
4 James J. Connors II, Nationwide Service of Process Under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act: The Need for Effective Fairness
Constraints, 73 VA. L. REv. 631, 632 (1987).
5Id.
6Chatham v. Brown, 858 F. Supp. 1130, 1146-50 (N.D.Fla. 1994).
7Id. at 1145.
8 More specifically, this section will examine the exercise of Florida's long-arm
jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant and the court's exercise of personal
jurisdiction over the defendant in light of constitutional constraints of "minimum
contacts" and fairness.
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Section IV concludes by forecasting the potential ramifications of the Chatham
case on future CERCLA cases.
II. FACTS
Chatham dealt with a suit brought by potentially responsible parties ("PRPs")
in a CERCLA action against other PRPs in order to get them to contribute to
the cleanup cost at a CERCLA site in Florida.9 Several PRPs had settled their
case with the United States and were seeking contribution on their response
costs from other PRPs at the site.10
In 1970, Sapp Battery Salvage Service, Inc. ("Sapp Battery") began recycling
spent lead-acid batteries at its facility near Cottendale, Florida.11 The company
was owned and operated by C. Brown Sapp. 12 The company bought spent
lead-acid batteries, cut them open with a hay bailer, recovered the lead, and
sold it to lead smelters. 13 During the recycling process, acid was discharged
onto the land and into a nearby swamp.14 Additionally, the spent battery
casings contaminated with lead were dumped or buried at the site.1
5
By 1979, Sapp Battery was processing approximately 5,000 batteries a day.
16
The batteries were purchased from scrap yards, businesses, and brokers. 17 One
of the scrap yards that sold spent batteries to Sapp Battery was Carolina Waste
& Salvage, later incorporated as Carolina Scrap Processing, Inc. (hereinafter
both will be referred to as "Carolina Scrap"). 18 Carolina Scrap was owned and
operated at the time in question by Charles Cleveland. 19
Neighbors began complaining of acidic runoff from the site.20 In January
1980, Jerry Sapp, the son of C. Brown and at that time owner of the company,
shut it down and walked away from the site.21
9 1d. at 1130. Seealso Section 117(f)(3)(B) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(3)(B) (stating:
"A person who has resolved his liability to the United States or a State for some or all of
a response action or for some or all of the costs of such action in an administrative or
judicially approved settlement may seek contribution from any person who is not party
to a settlement referred to in paragraph (2).").
1OChatham, 858 F. Supp. at 1130.
1 11d. at 1135.
12Id.
13 1d.
14 1d.
15 Chatham, 858 F. Supp. at 1135.
16 Id.
171d. at 1135-1136.
18 d. at 1146.
19 Id.
20Chatham, 858 F. Supp. at 1135.
1996]
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1996
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
The contaminated site was placed on the National Priorities List ("NPL") by
the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") in 1982.22 Ten years later, after
years of investigation and study at the site, the EPA issued a Unilateral
Administrative Order (UAO") against the plaintiffs Chatham Steel
Corporation, Mr. Sapp, and Carolina Scrap (et al.).23 Under Section 106 of
CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9606, the EPA has the authority to issue a PRP an
administrative order ordering the PRP to take response actions at a site
whenever there is an imminent or substantial endangerment to the public
health or welfare of the environment because of an actual or threatened release
of hazardous substances. The UAO required the named PRPs (including
Chatham Steel Corporation) to clean up the site.24 Once the UAO was issued,
the PRPs so ordered were statutorily required to comply with the Order or be
subject to treble damages (i.e., three times the amount of the United States' costs
incurred in cleaning the site).25
In 1993, Chatham (and dozens of other PRPs at the site), entered into a
consent decree with the United States.26 By signing the consent decree,
Chatham and others entered into a settlement agreement with the United States
agreeing to clean up the site and to pay the United States for the costs it incurred
at the site.27 Chatham Steel, et al. then sought to obtain assistance in the cleanup
and financing of the cleanup from Mr. Sapp, Carolina Scrap, Charles Cleveland
and other PRPs who did not join in the settlement with the United States.28 All
refused to contribute to the cleanup or pay the costs requested by Chatham
211d. at 1136.
22 1d. See generally, Section 104 of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (authorizing EPA to
respond to releases, or threatened releases of hazardous substances, pollutants, or
contaminants by taking actions to alleviate or eliminate the dangers these substances
pose. Specifically, the Act authorizes EPA to: (1) remove or arrange for the removal of
hazardous substances; (2) provide for remedial actions relating to hazardous
substances; and (3) take any response measures consistent with the National
Contingency Plan (NCP) which is deemed necessary to protect the public health, the
public welfare, or the environment).
23Id. at 1136. Under Section 106 of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9606, the EPA has the
authority to issue a PRP an administrative order ordering the PRP to take response
actions at a site whenever there is an imminent or substantial endangerment to the
public health or welfare of the environment because of an actual or threatened release
of hazardous substances.
24Chatham, 858 F. Supp. at 1136.
25Section 107(c)(3) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c)(3) (penalizing a defendant with
treble damages for failure to comply with a UAO).
26 Chatham, 858 F. Supp. at 1136.
271d.
28Id.
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Steel.29 In turn, Chatham Steel filed an action against Carolina Scrap and the
other non-settling PRPs.30
III. CERCLA LIABILITY
The congressional debates over CERCLA make it clear that Congress was
aware that the costs of response actions at CERCLA sites would greatly exceed
the monetary amount authorized by Superfund.3 1 Therefore, the Act was
written in a manner to ensure that those responsible for any property damage,
environmental harm or personal injury resulting from hazardous substances
bear the costs of their actions.32 The statute ensures that monies expended by
the United States during CERCLA response actions would be recovered from
the responsible parties.33
A. Overview of CERCLA Liability
Parties responsible for contamination at a CERCLA site are strictly liable for
all of the United States' response costs (removal and/or remedial costs)
associated with the clean up of the site as long as the costs incurred by the
United States are not inconsistent with the National Contingency Plan
("NCP").34 The amount of care utilized by the responsible party in handling the
hazardous substances in question is irrelevant.3 5 Additionally, if the harm at a
291d. See generally, 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) and (3) (stating that a PRP may seek
contribution from any other PRP who has not settled with the United States. CERCLA
specifically allows the settling PRP to bring a contribution action during or following a
response action pursuant to an administrative order, pursuant to Section 106, and/or
after a settlement with the United States).
30 Chatham, 858 F. Supp. at 1136.
31 See S. Rep. No. 96-848, at 17-18; H.R. Rep. No. 96-1016 at 20 (1980).
32 See S. Rep. No. 96-848 at 13 (1980). See also United States v. Aceto Agricultural Corp.,
872 F.2d 1373, 1377 (8th Cir. 1989); United States v. New Castle County, 727 F. Supp.
854, 858 (D. Del. 1989).
3342 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1996). See also United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical &
Chemical Co. ("NEPACCO"), 810 F.2d 726, 733 (8th Cir. 1986); Dedham Water Co. v.
Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074, 1081 (1st Cir. 1986).
3442 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A). See Aceto Agricultural Corp., 872 F.2d at 1379. See also
United States v. Kramer, 757 F. Supp. 397, 436 (D. N.J. 1991); United States v. Western
Processing Co., Inc., 734 F. Supp. 930, 942 (W.D. Wash. 1990).
35See Section 101(32) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(101)(32) (stating that the standard
of liability under the Act is the same as Section 311 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1321). Liability under Section 311 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321, is strict. See
e.g., United States v. M/V Big Sam, 681 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Lebeouf
Bros. Towing Co., 621 F.2d 787 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 906 (1981); United
States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1554 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
1046 (1991); United States v. R.W. Meyer Ins., 889 F.2d 1497 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
494 U.S. 1057 (1990); In Re Bell Petroleum Services, Inc., 3 F.3d 889, 897 (5th Cir. 1993).
19961
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CERCLA site is indivisible, the responsible parties are jointly and severally
liable.36
Liability under CERCLA extends to four categories of parties: (1) the current
owner or operator of the facility 37 at which there is a release or threatened
release of hazardous substances; (2) the past owner if he/she owned or
operated the facility at the time of disposal of hazardous substances at the
facility; (3) the person who arranged for disposal of hazardous substances at
the facility; and (4) the person who transported the hazardous substances to
the facility, if the transporter selected the facility as a disposal site.38
Once liability is established, the statute only allows four defenses.39 A party
may defend if it can establish that the release or threatened release of hazardous
36 See United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 410 U.S.
1106 (1989); United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 267 (3rd Cir. 1992);
O'Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176, 178 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied sub nom., American
Cyanamid Co. v. O'Neil, 493 U.S. 107 (1990). Volumetric contributions by themselves
can not determine divisible harm because the volume of waste each party contributes
(by itself) is not an accurate predictor of the potential harm to the public health and
environment. To accurately determine the harm that each party contributed to a site,
one must look at a myriad of factors including each chemical's toxicity, solubility,
votility and migratory potential. United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802,
811 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
37
"Facility" is defined broadly under CERCLA Section 101(9), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9) to
include (among other things): any building, structure, installation, equipment, pipe or
pipeline, well, pond, pit, lagoon, ditch, landfill, or any site where a hazardous substance
has been deposited, stored, disposed of, placed or otherwise come to be located.
3842 U.S.C. § 9607(a). See also, Chatham, 858 F.2d at 168. In its pertinent parts, Section
107(a) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) states:
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject
only to the defenses set forth in subsection (b) of this section:
(1) the owner operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous
substance owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous
substances were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged
for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for
transport for disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned
or possessed by such person, by any other party or entity, at any
facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by another party or
entity and containing such hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances
for transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels
or sites selected by such person, from which there is a release, or
threatened release which causes the incurrence of response costs,
of a hazardous substance, shall be liable for-
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United
States Government or a State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent
with the National Contingency Plan;
39 Section 107(b) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b), provides, in its relevant parts:
(b) There shall be no liability under subsection (a) of this section for
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substances was caused by: (1) an act of God; (2) an act of war; (3) an act or
omission of a third party; or (4) any combination of the previous three
defenses.40 No other defenses are allowed by the statute. 41
B. CERCLA Liability and the Chatham Case
The plaintiffs in Chatham contended that Carolina Scrap (and others) were
liable under Section 107(a)(3) of CERCLA as persons who "arranged for the
disposal" (i.e., generators) of hazardous substances at the Site.42 Carolina Scrap
(and several other defendants) argued that it could not be held liable under
Section 107(a)(3) of CERCLA because it did not "arrange" for disposal. 43
The argument was essentially that it sold spent lead acid batteries to Sapp
Battery and that after that, the handling of the scrap batteries became Sapp
Battery's responsibility. For the reasons that follow, the court rejected this
argument.
1. Defendant's Intent
First, Carolina Scrap argued that it was not liable under CERCLA because it
did not "intend" to dispose or treat the spent lead-acid batteries when it sold
them to Sapp.44 However, nowhere in the language of Section 107(a)(3) does
the word "intent" or "intend" appear.45 Additionally, CERCLA is a strict liability
a person otherwise liable who can establish by a preponderance of
the evidence that the release or threat of release of a hazardous sub-
stance and the damages resulting therefrom were caused solely by-
(1) an act of God;
(2) an act of war;
(3) an act or omission of a third party other than an employee
or agent of the defendant, other than one whose act or omission
occurs in connection with a contractual relationship, existing
directly or indirectly, with the defendant (except where the sole
contractual arrangement arises from a published tariff and accept-
ance for carriage by a common carrier by rail), if the defendant
establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that (a) he exercised
due care with respect to the hazardous substance concerned, taking
into consideration the characteristics of such hazardous substance,
in light of all relevant facts and circumstances, and (b) he took
precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions of any such third
party and the consequences that could foreseeably result from such
acts or omissions; or
(4) any combination of the foregoing paragraphs.
401d.
4 1 Id.
42Chatham, 858 F. Supp. at 1137. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3).
4 3 Chatham, 858 F. Supp. at 1138.
44 d.
4 5Id. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3).
1996]
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statute.46 Thus, Carolina Scrap's lack of intent does not serve as a defense to
CERCLA liability.47 Moreover, the court found that the defendant did, indeed,
intend to traffic in hazardous substances. 48 This is precisely the type of activity
that CERCLA was created to cover.49 The product it sold, spent lead-acid
batteries, could no longer generate electrical current, and therefore, its only
usefulness came through the residual value of the batteries' hazardous casing,
i.e. the lead.50 The court found that Carolina Scrap took a product that it no
longer had a use for and sold it for breaking, processing, treatment, and then,
for disposal of any remaining wastes.51
2. Defendant's Knowledge
Carolina Scrap next contended that it did not know where or how Sapp
Battery was treating or disposing of the batteries.52 Defendant argued that it
could not have "arranged for" disposal or treatment without knowledge. 53 Yet,
this argument fails for the same reason as the intent argument; CERCLA is a
strict liability offense.54 Courts have consistently held that a defendant need
not know where or how a hazardous substance was to be disposed of or treated
to be liable under Section 107(a)(3).55 As the Court stated in United States v.
Ward:
46Chatham, 858 F. Supp. at 1138. See Section 101(32) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(32)
(providing that the standard of review under CERCLA is the same as Section 311 of the
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321; liability under Section 311 of the Clean Water Act is
strict). See also United States v. Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1379 (8th Cir.
1989), (stating that responsible parties are strictly liable for response costs incurred);
3550 Stevens Creek Associates v. Barclays Bank, 915 F.2d 1355, 1357 (9th Cir. 1990)
(stating CERCLA generally imposes strict liability on owners and operators of facilities
at which hazardous substances were disposed); R.W. Meyer Inc., 889 F.2d at 1497, 1507(stating CERCLA contemplates strict liability); see generally, Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d
at 1550, 1554; In re Bell Petroleum Service, Inc., 3 F.3d at 889, 897.
47 Chatham, 858 F. Supp. at 1139. See also at 724 ("Section 9607(a)(3) liability may attach
even if the potentially responsible party did not intend to dispose of the hazardous
substances").
48 Chatham, 858 F. Supp. at 1140.
49Id.
50Id.
511d. at 1141. See generally Section 103(3) and 103(34) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9603(3)
and 9603(34) (respectively) (defining "disposal" and "treatment").
52 Chatham, 858 F. Supp. at 1142.
53 Id.
541d. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
551d. at 1142. See Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d at 1381 (stating CERCLA liability
attaches "even when defendants did not know the substances would be deposited at
that site or in fact believed they would be deposited elsewhere); United States v. Ward,
618 F. Supp. 884,895 (E.D.N.C. 1985)(holding that a generator is still strictly liable under
[Vol. 44:473
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[t]he assertion that CERCLA requires a generator who arranges for disposal
to know where the disposal takes place before liability is established is
unfounded...
[T]he statute merely provides that a generator "who arranged for
disposal or treatment"... of the generator's hazardous substances at a
"facility" not owned by the generator would still be strictly liable under
CERCLA.
56
Generators cannot escape CERCLA liability by simply claiming "they did not
know."57 The Chatham court found that reading a knowledge requirement into
Section 107(a)(3) of CERCLA would simply encourage generators to "play
dumb" in order to escape liability; therefore, Carolina Scrap could not eschew
its responsibilities under CERCLA because it allegedly did not know the
location or method of the disposal or treatment of its hazardous substances.
5 8
3. Defendant's Decision
Finally, Carolina Scrap argued that it should not be held liable under Section
107(a)(3) of CERCLA because it did not ultimately make the decision regarding
lead-acid batteries' treatment or disposal.59 The court agreed that the "decision
test" was relevant to the analysis of Section 107(a)(3) liability.60 Yet, the court
did not find this test to be exculpatory.61 Rather, the court held that Carolina
Scrap (and the other named generators) did indeed make the crucial decision
as to how, when and by whom their hazardous substance, spent lead-acid
batteries, would be disposed and treated. 62 Carolina Scrap decided that Sapp
Battery would treat and dispose of its spent lead-acid batteries.63
Ultimately, the court rejected defendant's contention that it was not liable as
a generator who "arranged for disposal and treatment" within the meaning of
CERCLA. 64 Section 107(a)(3) does not require intent or knowledge.6 5 The court
CERCLA even if the generator does not know where the disposal takes place).
56 Ward, 618 F. Supp. at 895 (emphasis added).
571d.
58Chatham, 858 F. Supp. at 1142 (quoting Ward, 618 F. Supp. at 895).
59Id.
60 d. See United States v. A & F Materials, 582 F. Supp. 842,845 (S.D. Ill. 1984) (stating
107(a)(3) liability is not endless; generators must make the crucial decision of how their
hazardous substances are to be disposed of or treated).
61Chatham, 858 F. Supp. at 1143.
62 Id.
63Id.
64id.
65 Chatham, 858 F. Supp. at 1143. See supra notes 46 and 54 and accompanying text.
19961
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held that the defendant "decided" to send its spent lead-acid batteries to Sapp
for treatment and disposal.66 Therefore, the defendant, Carolina Scrap, was a
generator of hazardous substances and liable pursuant to CERCLA (even
though the transaction involved a middleman).6 7 However, this did not end
the court's analysis of the case.6 8 After determining that Carolina Scrap
was within the class of persons upon which CERCLA imposes liability,6 9 the
court analyzed and discussed the issue of personal jurisdiction as it related to
the company.70
IV. JURISDICTION
In determining whether it had personal jurisdiction over Carolina Scrap, the
Chatham court first determined whether Florida's long-arm statute even
authorized an exercise of jurisdiction. 71 Then, it determined whether Carolina
66 Chatham, 858 F. Supp. at 1143.
671d. at 1144.
68Id.
69 1d. at 1137. The Court specifically rejected defendant's argument that it could not
be liable under CERCLA as a generator who "arranged for" disposal and treatment
unless it could be proven that defendant specifically intended for Sapp Battery to treat
or dispose of the spent batteries and/or the defendant had knowledge of how and where
Sapp Battery was conducting the disposal. See United States v Fleet Factors, 821 F. Supp.
707, 724 (S.D. Ga. 1993) (stating: "Section 9607(a)(3) liability may attach even if the
potentially responsible party did not intend to dispose of the hazardous substances");
Ward, 618 F. Supp. at 884, 895 (D.C.N.C. 1985)(stating that reading a knowledge
requirement into Section 107(a)(3) of CERCLA would simply encourage generators to
escape liability by "playing dumb" regarding the disposal of their hazardous wastes).
See generally CERCLA Section 107(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3) (imposing liability upon
any person who contracts, agrees, or otherwise arranges for the disposal or treatment
of hazardous substances, owned or possessed by such person, with another person, at
a facility owned or operated by another person. That is to say, a generator of hazardous
substances is liable if: it owned or possessed hazardous substances; the generator
contracted or arranged for the disposal or treatment of hazardous substances at a site;
the substances were transported to the site; and they were disposed of at the site upon
which a release or threatened release of similar hazardous substances has occurred).
701d. at 1143. (The Court also specifically rejected the argument asserted by
Cleveland, Carolina Scrap and other defendants that they did not "arrange for" disposal
and treatment of hazardous substances (within the meaning of CERCLA) when they
"sold" spent lead-acid batteries to Sapp Battery). See generally, Chesapeake and Potomac
Tel. Co. v. Peck Iron & Metal, 814 F. Supp. 1269 (E.D. Va. 1992) and United States v.
Pesses, 794 F. Supp. 151 (W.D. Pa. 1992) (holding sellers of spent batteries "arranged for
the treatment or disposal" of hazardous substances); A & F Materials, Inc., 582 F. Supp.
at 842,845 (holding that a company's sale of spent caustic solutions to A & F which used
the solution to neutralize acidic oils, constituted an arrangement for disposal within the
meaning of CERCLA); Ward, 618 F. Supp. at 895 (stating that liability under CERCLA
cannot be avoided by merely characterizing the transaction in question as a sale).
71Chatham, 858 F. Supp. at 1146.
[Vol. 44:473
10https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol44/iss4/5
PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND CERCLA
Scrap had sufficient minimum contacts with Florida to satisfy constitutional
Due Process requirements. 72
A. Long-Arm Jurisdiction
The court relied heavily on the cases of United States v. Conservation Chemical
Co. ("Conservation Chemical II")73 and United States v. Consolidated Rail Corp.74
in order to decide whether Florida's long-arm statute could be applied to
Carolina Scrap.75
Conservation Chemical II involved a chemical company, Conservation
Chemical Company ("CCC"), that owned and operated an industrial chemical
waste facility in Kansas City, Missouri. 76 Over the years, the CCC site became
contaminated with numerous hazardous chemicals.77 As part of the case, the
court was required to determine if it could exercise jurisdiction over the
nonresident generators of hazardous waste.7 8 As a prerequisite, the court had
to determine if Missouri's long-arm statute could be applied to the release or
threatened release of hazardous substances under CERCLA.79 Since the
long-arm statute did not specifically mention CERCLA (or any other
environmental statute), the court was required to determine if the actions of
hazardous waste generators could be properly characterized as one of the
enumerated acts within the statute, i.e., a tort.
80
To construe the generator's acts as a tort, the court was required to find that
the generators had a duty, there was a breach of that duty, and the breach of
duty proximately caused an injury.8 1 Moreover, longstanding case law has held
that to give rise to tortious liability, the duty must be created and imposed by
721d. See generally, Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877) (requiring certain minimum
contacts with a forum state before in personam jurisdiction can be constitutionally
exercised).
73United States v. Conservation Chemical Co. ("Conservation Chemical Ir') 619 F.
Supp. 162 (W.D. Mo. 1985).
74United States v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 674 F. Supp. 138 (D. Del. 1987).
75 Chatham 858 F. Supp. at 1142. See Conservation Chemical II, 619 F. Supp. at 245;
Consolidated Rail, 674 F. Supp. at 143.
76 Conservation Chemical II, 619 F. Supp. at 182.
771d. at 183. The record shows that the surface soils, subsurface soils, surface water,
and groundwater all contained such hazardous chemicals as methylene chloride,
trichloroethylene, 1,1,1-trichloroethane, toluene, cadmium, lead, selenium, benzene,
arsenic and cyanide.
781d.
79Id.
80619 F. Supp. 245.
8 lId. See also Munger v Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U.S., 2 F. Supp. 914, 920 (W.D.
Mo. 1933) (holding that an unreasonable delay in processing a life insurance policy does
not satisfy the three elements necessary for liability in tort).
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law.82 After reviewing the case law, the court found that the release of
hazardous substances creating an imminent danger to the public health,
welfare, property, and/or environment was in the nature of a tort.83
Additionally, the generator's actions outside of the state that led to actionable
consequences in Missouri were "commissions of a tortious act in the state"
within the meaning of the Missouri long-arm statute.84
In Consolidated Rail Corp., the United States brought an action against several
PRPs to recover response costs for its clean-up of hazardous waste at the
Sealand disposal site (hereinafter referred to as "Sealand or "the Site") in
Delaware. 85 Consolidated Rail Corp. ("Conrail") and other defendants filed an
action against the Globe Newspaper Company (hereinafter referred to as
"Globe") and others seeking indemnification and/or contribution pursuant to
Section 107 of CERCLA.86 As in Conservation Chemical, the court had to
determine if the state's long-arm statute established jurisdiction over
out-of-state generators of hazardous waste. 87 As in Conservation Chemical II, the
court in Consolidated Rail Corp. utilized the language in the state's long-arm
statute relating to extraterritorial actions that have consequences within the
state.88 The court found that Section 3104(c)(4) of Delaware's long-arm
82 Conservation Chemical II, 619 F. Supp. at 245. See also Donovan v. Kansas City, 175
S.W. 2d 874, 882, modified 179 S.W.2d 108 (Mo. 1944) (stating: "To give rise to an action
in tort, the right violated must have been created and the corresponding duty must have
been imposed by law").
83 1d. at 246. See Fulton v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific R.R. Co., 481 F.2d 326,331-33
(8th Cir. 1973)(interpreting "tort" and "commission of a tortious act" to include
extraterritorial acts producing actionable consequences in Missouri under Missouri's
long-arm statute); United States v. Mottolo, 629 F. Supp. 56,60 (D.N.H. 1984) (finding
that corporate officers who participate in activities that lead to the release of hazardous
substances may be individually liable for their "tortious conduct" under CERCLA). See
also United States v. Shamrock Barge, 635 F.2d 1108, 1112 (4th Cir. 1980)(analogizing
comparable provisions of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq.,
to tort law).
841d. at 246. See Fulton v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific R.R. Co., supra note 43, at
331 (construing the "commission of tortious act" within the state to include
extraterritorial torts that lead to consequences within the state). See generally American
Law Institute's Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Law § 37(a)(1971) (stating "one who
intentionally shoots a bullet into a state is as subject to the judicial jurisdiction of the
state as to causes of action arising from the effects of the shot as if he had actually fired
the bullet in the state").
85 Consolidated Rail Corp., 674 F. Supp. at 141.
86 1d. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607. See also supra note 26 (and accompanying text)(explaining
the right of contribution under CERCLA).
87 Consolidated Rail Corp., 647 F. Supp. at 142. See also Conservation Chemical 11, 619 F.
Supp. at 242.
88 Consolidated Rail Corp., 647 F. Supp. at 143; Conservation Chemical II, 619 F. Supp. at
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statute89 granted jurisdiction over the Globe because its out-of-state actions
caused in-state tortious injuries.90
The Chatham court utilized the same reasoning as the courts in Conservation
Chemical II and Consolidated Rail Corp. and concluded that Virginia's long-arm
statute could be applied to exercise jurisdiction over the extraterritorial
generators of hazardous waste.9 1 The court also determined that the Chatham
case was analogous to cases where courts have found violations of other federal
statutes to be "tortious" acts under Florida's long-arm statute.9 2 Carolina
Scrap's "arrangement" with Sapp Battery for the disposal and/or treatment of
spent lead-acid batteries helped to ultimately create a serious environmental
hazard in the state of Florida.93 Adopting the logic of Conservation Chemical II
and Consolidated Rail Corp., the court in Chatham held that Carolina Scrap was
subject to Florida's jurisdiction because Carolina Scrap's extraterritorial actions
assisted in the commission of a tortious act in Florida (within the meaning of
the Florida statute).94
B. In Personam Jurisdiction
Once the court determined that Florida's long-arm statute conferred
jurisdiction over Cleveland, it had to determine whether the exercise of that
8 9 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3104(c)(4)(Supp.1986).
90 Consolidated Rail Corp., 647 F. Supp. at 142. See also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10,
§ 3104(c)(4)(Supp. 1986)(stating that the court may exercise jurisdiction over any person
or corporation that: "[clauses tortious injury in the State or outside of the State by an act
or omission outside the State if he regularly does or solicits business, engages in any
other persistent course of conduct in the State or derives substantial revenue from
services, or things used or consumed in the State"). The Court concluded that statute
allowed it to exercise jurisdiction over Globe because Globe's action caused tortious
injury (i.e., environmental harm) within the state, and by selling newspapers in
Delaware, Globe derived substantial revenue from the state.
9 1Chatham, 858 F. Supp. at 1146.
921d. See e.g., Cable/Home Communication, 902 F.2d 829,856 (11th Cir. 1990) (finding
violations of federal copyright and communications laws to be sufficient to trigger
Florida long-arm jurisdiction); Williams Electric Co., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 854 F.2d
389, 394 (11th Cir. 1988)(holding that violations of federal anti-trust laws constitutes
tortious behavior within the meaning of the Florida Long-arm statute).
93Chatham, 858 F. Supp. at 1146.
941d. See also, FLA. STAT. Ch. 48.193(1)(b)(1997) (stating in its pertinent parts:
(1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state,
who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumer-
ated in this subsection thereby submits himself and, if he is a
natural person, his personal representative to the jurisdiction of
the courts of this state for any cause of action arising from the
doing of any of the following acts:
(b) Committing a tortious act within this state.
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jurisdiction violated the Due Process clause of the 14th Amendment.95 This
required a determination of whether the exercise of in personam jurisdiction
was in accordance with long-standing case law.
In personam, that is to say, personal jurisdiction, quite simply is the concept
relating to a court's power to bind a particular defendant to its judgment.96 It
should not be confused with service of process. Service of process is the
procedure by which a defendant is notified of a pending action.97 However,
the law of jurisdiction is not concerned with notice.98 Rather, when examining
jurisdiction, one examines the power of a court to determine a defendant's
obligations and the propriety of the court in doing so.
More specifically, in personam jurisdiction delimits a court's utilization of
its power to render an enforceable judgment against a defendant. 99 The United
States Supreme Court has long recognized that personal jurisdiction is based
upon the sovereign's power over the person of the defendant. 100 In personam
jurisdiction represents the court's authority to command personal obedience
and impose personal obligations. The primary notion being that a court gains
its power over a person as a direct result of the sovereign's authority over
persons within its territory01 Without personal jurisdiction, a court cannot
impose personal liability upon a defendant or affect a defendant's personal
rights.102 By this reasoning, before the court in Chatham could impose CERCLA
liability upon the defendant, it was required to determine its jurisdiction over
the defendant.
1. Overview of Personal Jurisdiction
In Pennoyer v. Neff,103 the Court held that a court's authority to adjudicate is
restricted to the territorial limits of the state in which it is established. 104 In
95 Chatham, 858 F. Supp. at 1146. See generally, William M. Richman, Understanding
Personal Jurisdiction, 25 ARIz. ST. L.J. 599 (1993)(for a more detailed discussion on in
personam jurisdiction); Fullerton, Constitutional Limits On Nationwide Personal
Jurisdiction In the Federal Courts, 79 Nw. U. L. REV. 1 (1984)(arguing that the Fifth
Amendment limits personal jurisdiction and should be used to limit nationwide
jurisdiction).
96 See Robert H. Abrams, Power, Convenience, and the Elimination of Personal Jurisdiction
in the Federal Courts, 58 IND. L.J. 1, 4 (1982).
971d.
98 Jay Conison, What Does Due Process Have to Do With Jurisdiction, 46 RUTGERS L. REV.
1071, 1074 (1994).
99 See Burnham v. Superior Court of California., 495 U.S. 604, 609 (1990).
lOOPennoyer, 95 U.S. at 720.
101Janice Toran, Federalism, Personal Jurisdiction, and Aliens, 58 TUL. L. REV. 758, 758-70
(1984).
1 0 2 See Burnham, 495 U.S. at 609.
103 See supra note 72.
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1945, in the case of International Shoe v. State of Washington, lOS the Courtdeparted from the traditional logic of Pennoyer which emphasized sovereignty
as a prerequisite to jurisdiction and the power to validly bind an individual to
a court's judgment. 106 International Shoe amended and expanded Pennoyer by
emphasizing constitutional due process rather than traditional sovereignty.107
Unlike Pennoyer, International Shoe focused on the rights of the defendant,
which is appropriate since the right of due process as it relates to jurisdiction
is only possessed by the defendant.108
International Shoe clearly established two constitutional themes relevant tothe exercise of personal jurisdiction.109 These are fairness and sovereign
power1 10 The Supreme Court made it clear that the Constitution would not
allow a court to make a binding in personam judgment against a party that had
no contacts, ties, or relation to the court's state.1 11 Rather, for a court to
successfully exercise in personam jurisdiction, the party in question must have
certain minimum contacts with the state (that is, the situs of the court) such
that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play
and justice.112
In the Chatham case, the constitutional criteria of International Shoe was
addressed. At the time in question, Carolina Scrap did not own property inFlorida, have offices in Florida, or even have a license to do business inFlorida.113 As a matter of fact, aside from its dealings with Sapp Battery,Carolina Scrap did not have any contacts with the State of Florida.114 So, in
104Id.
105 1nternational Shoe v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
106 Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722. See Fullerton, supra note 95, at 9 (stating that International
Shoe jettisoned Pennoyer's test in favor of a Due Process analysis).
10 71nternational Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319 (1945).
108 Mona A. Lee, Burger King's Bifircated Test for Personal Jurisdiction: The ReasonablenessInquiry Impedes Judicial Economy And Threatens A Defendant's Due Process Rights, 66Temple Law Rev. 945, 947 (1993). See also, Daan Braverman, Interstate Federalism andPersonal Jurisdiction, 33 SYRACUSE L. REV. 533, 542 (1982) (discussing fairness todefendants as it relates to the Due Process clause); David A. Sonnenshein, The Error ofA Balancing Approach To The Determination Of Jurisdiction Over The Person, 59 TEMP. L. Q.47,48 (1986) (arguing that it is not appropriate for a court to balance a plaintiff's interest
against a defendant's when considering due process in the context of personaljurisdiction).
109 Kevin M. Clermont, Restating Territorial Jurisdiction and Venue for State and Federal
Courts, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 411,415 (1981).
110 d.
H1Id.
1121d. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940).
113Chatham, 858 F. Supp. at 1143.
1141d. at 1145.
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determining jurisdiction, the court was obliged to consider the constitutional
constraints of "minimum contacts and fairness," as well as the application of
the forum state's long-arm statute.115
The Supreme Court has made it clear that pre-litigation contacts between the
defendant and the forum state are a prerequisite to exercising long-arm
jurisdiction. In the words of the Court:
[Tihe Due Process Clause "does not contemplate that a state may
[exercise jurisdiction over] ... an individual... with which the state
has no contacts, ties, or relations." Even if the defendant would suffer
minimal or no inconvenience... ; even if the forum State has a strong
interest in applying its law to the controversy; even if the forum State
is the most convenient location for the litigation, the Due Process
Clause... may sometimes divest the State of power to render a valid
judgment.116
2. Minimum Contacts
In order to comport with the requisite constitutional delimitation, a court
can only exercise in personam jurisdiction if a defendant has had certain
minimum contacts with the state, and the exercise of jurisdiction in the
particular case seems just and fair.117 It is obvious that this limitation is
anything but straightforward. Such a standard is highly subjective and difficult
to apply.118 Consequently, courts and parties alike have struggled in
determining what "minimum contacts" and "fairness" mean in the
jurisdictional context.119 Of course, any confusion related to vague theories of
fairness and minimum contacts is only exacerbated in a case like Chatham,
where a defendant may be already confused by the terminology of CERCLA.
In evaluating a defendant's minimum contacts, courts have distinguished
between contacts establishing "specific" and "general" jurisdiction.120 Specific
jurisdiction is the authority of a court over a nonresident defendant in a law-
suit arising from or related to the defendant's specific contacts with the forum
1151d. at 1146.
116Richman, supra note 94, at 612 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980)).
l17Id.
118See, International Shoe, 326 at 325 (Black, J., concurring). See also, David S. Welkowitz,
Beyond Burger King: The Federal Interest Personal Jurisdiction, 56 FORDHAM L. REv. 1, 3
(discussing the ambiguity inherent in the fairness doctrine espoused by the Court in
International Shoe).
1 1 9 1d.
120Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977).
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state. 121 General jurisdiction is also based upon a defendant's contacts with the
forum state, but the contacts are unrelated to the cause of action.122
The Chatham court decided its case using specific jurisdiction, since the cause
of action was specifically based upon the defendant's contacts (albeit indirect
contacts) with the state. 12 3 The court used the criteria established in the
Eleventh Circuit case, Vermuelen v. Renault U.S.A., Inc.124 In Vermuelen, the court
established three criteria relative to minimum contacts prior to the application
of specific jurisdiction: 1) The contacts must be related to or have given rise to
the plaintiff's cause of action;125 2) the contacts must involve some act(s) by
which the defendant purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting
activities within the forum state, thereby invoking the benefits and protection
of its laws;126 and 3) the contacts must be such that the defendant can
reasonably anticipate being haled into court in the forum state. 127
Following Vermuelen's reasoning, the court found that Carolina Scrap's
contacts with the State of Florida were related to the cause of action,
128
plaintiff's cause of action was one to recover a portion of its response costs for
the environmental cleanup of an abandoned battery recycling facility from
Carolina Scrap,129 and Carolina Scrap's contacts with the forum were through
the sale of spent lead acid batteries to the owner and operator of the facility for
processing and treatment. 130 The court also concluded that Carolina Scrap
"purposely availed" itself of the privilege of conducting business in Florida,13 1
in that the defendant sold its scrap batteries to a Florida company for proces-
121 Chatham, 858 F. Supp. at 1146. See also, Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S.
462, 473, n. 15; and Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408,414, nn.
8 and 9 (1984).
122/l/.
123 Chatham, 858 F. Supp. at 1147. The court held that the plaintiffs had not claimed
that Carolina Scrap had sufficient contacts with Florida to establish general jurisdiction.
124 Chatham, 858 F. Supp. at 1147. See Vermuelen v. Renault U.S.A., Inc., 985 F.2d 1534
(11th Cir.).
125 Chatham, 858 F. Supp. at 1147. See Vermeulen, 985 F.2d at 1546. See also Burger King
Corp., 471 U.S. at 472; Madara v. Hall, 916 F.2d 1510, 1516 (11th Cir. 1990).
126Chatham, 858 F. Supp. at 1147. See Vermeulen, 985 F.2d at 1546 (quoting Hanson v.
Denckla, 375 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
12 7Chatham, 858 F. Supp. at 1147. See Vermeulen, 985 F.2d at 1546 (quoting World-wide
Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297).
128Chatham, 858 F. Supp. at 1147.
129 Id.
130 d.
1311d.
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sing and disposal. 132 In this manner, the defendant benefitted from Sapp's
Florida business.133
The court struggled with the third criteria, i.e., should the defendant's
contacts have reasonably led it to anticipate being haled into court.134 One very
large hurdle the court had to jump was the fact that at the time the defendant
sold its scrap batteries, CERCLA did not exist. 135 Nevertheless, the court
reasoned that there was an environmental statute in effect governing the
handling of hazardous waste at the time in question, the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA"). 13 6 Therefore, the court reasoned
that the defendant was aware of its responsibilities under federal law to
properly store, treat, transport and dispose of its hazardous waste. 13 7 Certainly,
defendant knew or should have known that if its actions contributed to the
improper disposal of hazardous substances in the forum it could be haled into
federal court to answer for the illegal dumping of hazardous waste. 138 The
court held that by dealing with a Florida company for the treatment and
disposal of its hazardous substances, the defendant should have foreseen the
possibility of being haled into a Florida court if there was any environmental
litigation resulting from this business transaction. 139
The Chatham court's analysis is consistent with the Supreme Court's holding
in World-Wide Volkswagen,140 where (as in Chatham) there were no direct
contacts with the forum and the defendant.141 However, the Supreme Court
held that a court may properly exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant that places a product into the stream of commerce with the
expectation that the product will be purchased by consumers in the forum
state. 142 Clearly, by selling its spent lead-acid batteries to a Florida battery
recycling company, the defendant should have reasonably expected the
batteries to become located in Florida.
132Id.
133Chatham, 858 F. Supp. at 1147.
1341d. at 1148.
1351d. See also supra note 2.
136Chatham, 858 F. Supp. at 1148; see 42 U.S.C. 6901 et seq. (RCRA was enacted in 1976).
137Id.
138ld.
139 d. See also Conservation Chemical Co., 619 F. Supp. at 249 (concluding that a
generator can reasonably anticipate being haled into a court in any state where
defendant's hazardous substances have been released).
14 0See generally, World-Wide Volkswagen, 326 U.S. at 319.
1 4 11d.
14 21d. at 297-98.
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Although the court did not mention it, the Chatham court's analysis is also
consistent with the holding of the Supreme Court in Burger King v. Rudzewicz. 14 3
In Burger King, the Supreme Court held that an action of the defendant must
be purposefully directed toward the forum state as a prerequisite to a court
finding minimum contacts with the state.144 In Chatham, the court correctly
concluded that the defendant placed its hazardous substances into the hands
of Sapp Battery, knowing that the batteries only had value to Sapp Battery
because it could recycle them in Cottondale, Florida and recover the lead. 145
The defendant directed the batteries toward Florida.
The Chatham analysis is also consistent with many other court opinions in
that courts have often held that the minimum contacts test is not merely an
exercise in quantitative analysis. 146 Rather, when determining whether a
defendant's contacts with the forum are sufficient to reasonably anticipate
being haled into the forum's courts, one must consider the nature and/or
quality of the contacts as well as their number. 147 When courts have considered
the nature and/or quality of defendant's contacts, many have held that if
defendant's contacts with the forum are dangerous or hazardous in nature,
those contacts may be sufficient to satisfy due process even though the number
of contacts is few.14 8
143471 U.S. 462.
144See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476-77. See also, Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior
Court, 107 S.Ct. 1026, 1032 (1987) (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475)(holding that
there must be a substantial connection between the defendant and the forum state
showing that the defendant purposely directed action toward the forum state). See
generally, Welkowitz, supra note 118 (examining the problem of personal jurisdiction in
federal courts and developing an analytical framework for resolving personal
jurisdiction questions).
145858 F. Supp. at 1148.
146 See Velandra v. Regie Nationales des Usines Renault, 336 F.2d 292, 298 (6th Cir.
1968); Allied Towing v. Great Eastern Petroleum Corp., 642 F. Supp. 1339 (E.D. Va. 1986);
Securities and Exchange Commission v. Meyers, 285 F. Supp. 743, 749 (D. Md. 1968).
1471d.
148 See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 306 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Ohio
v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U.S. 493 (1971): "(C)orporations having no direct
contact with Ohio could constitutionally be brought to trial in Ohio because they
dumped pollutants outside Ohio's limits which ultimately . . . reached Ohio. No
corporate acts, only their consequences, occurred in Ohio. The stream of commerce is
just as natural a force as a stream of water...."). See also Velandra, 336 F.2d at 298 (stating
that a lesser volume of dangerous products constitutes a more significant contact than
would a larger volume of products offering little or no hazards to inhabitants of the
state); Chattanooga v. Klingler, 528 F. Supp. 372,378 (E.D. Tenn. 1981) (reversed on other
grounds, 704 F.2d 903 (6th Cir. 1983)(noting that constitutionally required contacts may
be minimized if they involve the placing of a dangerous instrumentality into the stream
of commerce; Lichina v. Futura, 260 F. Supp. 252,257 (D. Colo. 1966) ("Because the safety
of the public is at stake, the sale of a dangerous product is regarded as a more substantial
contact than the sale of a harmless one.").
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3. Fairness
Having concluded that the defendant's contacts with the forum were
sufficient to satisfy due process, the Chatham court next addressed the issue of
whether the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant comports with
"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."149 In International Shoe,
the Supreme Court went far beyond the ideas of territorialism and sovereignty
expressed in Pennoyer.15 0 International Shoe curtailed the exercise of personal
jurisdiction by constitutionally circumscribing a court's jurisdictional power
with notions of "fairness and justice."151 Fairness, i.e., the relationship among
the defendant, the forum, and the litigation, rather than the mutual exclusive
sovereignty of the states is the central concern of a court's inquiry into personal
jurisdiction. 152
Over the past decade and a half, the Supreme Court has indicated that
fairness or reasonableness (along with contacts) is part of a mandatory
two-stage test for jurisdiction.153 In determining the fairness of exercising
jurisdiction in Chatham, the court looked to the following factors: 1) the burden
on the defendant; 2) the forum state's interest in adjudicating the dispute; 3)
the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief; 4) the
interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief;
and 5) the shared interest of the several states in furthering fundamental
substantive social policies. 154 The court understood that these considerations
can serve to establish the reasonableness (fairness) of jurisdiction upon a lesser
showing of minimum contacts. 155
14 9 Chatham, 858 F. Supp. at 1148. See also International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
150 See 2 J. Moore; Moore's Federal Practice §4.25 [5] (2nd ed. 1982); 4 C. Wright & A.
Miller 2223-34.
151Id. See also Connors, supra note 4 at 634 (1987)(stating International Shoe elevated
fairness in determining a litigation site to a constitutional level); Abrams, supra note 96
at 12 (stating Pennoyer stressed the state's sovereign power, and International Shoe spoke
of concern for fair treatment of the defendant as a constitutional limitation of a court's
power); Toran, supra note 101 at 760 (stating International Shoe expressly rejected
territoriality as a basis for jurisdiction).
152 Alex Wilson Albright, In Personam Jurisdiction: A Confitsed and Inappropriate
Substitutefor Forum Non Conveniens, 71 TEX. L. REV. 351, 386 (1992).
153 See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292; Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476-77; Asahi,
107 S. Ct. at 116.
154 Chatham, 858 F. Supp. at 1148. See also, Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477 (quoting
World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292)
courts.. . may evaluate "the burden on the defendant," "the forum
state's interest in adjudicating the dispute," the plaintiff's interest
in obtaining convenient and effective relief, the interstate judicial
system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of contro-
versies, and the shared interest of the several states in furthering
fundamental substantive social policies.
155Chatham, 858 F. Supp. at 1148; see Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477.
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a. "Burden"
According to the Supreme Court, the burden on a defendant is always a
primary concern. 156 However, the Chatham court determined that the burden
on the defendant was insignificant. 157 The court based this on the fact that the
distance between South Carolina and the Northern District of Florida is not
great. 158 The court posited that thus far, neither the defendant nor its attorney
had to travel to Florida for hearings. 159 Moreover, the court observed that if the
defendant did go to trial, it would not have numerous witnesses nor evidence
to transport from South Carolina.160 The court also found that the state of
modern communication greatly diminished any litigation burden on
defendant.161
Clearly, the court's logic is correct as far as it goes, but it leaves many
questions unanswered. For instance, what if the defendant was a corporation
located in California instead of South Carolina? At what relative geographical
proximity does the distance between the defendant and the forum become
significant enough to be an unconstitutional 'burden" on the defendant?
Similarly, the court failed to espouse a useful principle for cases where the
defendant and its attorney are required to adjudicate their case in the forum
state, both at hearing and at trial, including the full panoply of witnesses and
documentary evidence usually associated with CERCLA litigation.
The court's statement that modem communication technology alleviated
any burden on the defendant is a truism. It is obviously true that modem
technology has lessened the burden on all parties prior to and during trial.
Using modern technology: one can simultaneously hold telephonic
conferences with numerous people throughout the world; immediately
transmit legal documents across the nation via fax or electronic mail; or
instantaneously be present at a deposition hundreds of miles away through
video teleconferencing. However, the court's reasoning is mere sophistry
unless the court is holding that modern technology has effectively replaced the
conventional time-honored adjudicatory practice of face-to-face confrontation
between defendants and plaintiffs. By its very nature, litigation is burdensome;
instead of ignoring this fact, the court should recognize it. Before dismissing
the defendant's burdens as insignificant, the court should at least fully discuss
those burdens.
156 See Richman, supra note 94 at 627. See also World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292.
157 Chatham, 858 F. Supp. at 1148.
1581d. at 1149.
15 9Id.
160ld.
161ld.
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b. "Forum State's Interest in Adjudicating the Dispute"
The Supreme Court has given considerable attention to a forum state's
interest in adjudicating disputes.162 A common theme in these cases has been
the state's interest in providing a forum for its residents to redress grievances
against outsiders. 16 3 Similarly, the Chatham court recognized the patent interest
of the state of Florida in adjudicating a dispute involving environmental
contamination in Florida. 164 The court recognized that it is Florida's residents
that will have to live with the long-term effects of the contamination; it is
Florida's property that has been damaged; therefore, it is Florida that has the
compelling sovereign interest in adjudicating the case. 165
c. "Plaintiff's Interest in Obtaining Convenient and Effective Relief"
The Court has long held that a plaintiff's interest in a readily available and
convenient forum is an important consideration in jurisdictional analysis. 16 6
Courts generally favor this type of analysis because it gives the plaintiff a forum
in which to sue an elusive defendant and allows plaintiff to sue at home. 16 7
Courts use this to determine the burden upon the plaintiff. The Chatham court
determined that the plaintiffs would face a significant burden if they had to sue
162Richnan, supra note 95 at 629. See also Burger King, 471 U.S. at 483 (discussing
Florida's legitimate interest in determining claims related to contacts in that state);
McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957) (noting that states
often have a manifest interest in providing effective means of redress for their residents).
163Id.
164Chatham, 858 F. Supp. at 1149.
1651d.
166See Richman, supra note 143 at 631. See generally, McGee, 355 U.S. at 223 (discussing
plaintiff's difficulty in pursuing claims outside of the forum as a partial reason for
granting jurisdiction); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977) (stating jurisdiction over
an otherwise unamenable defendant might be appropriate when no other forum is
available to plaintiff); Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, 466 U.S. at 412 (finding lack of
convenient forum did not militate the granting of jurisdiction); Asahi, 480 U.S. at 114
(holding the most convenient forum for a Taiwanese corporation which filed an
indemnity claim in California against a Japanese manufacturer was in Japan). See
generally, Russell J. Weintraub, Asahi Sends Personal Jurisdiction Down the Tubes, 23 TEX.
INT'L L.J. 55,62-63 (1988) (discussing the personal jurisdiction and forum non conveniens
in the context of Asahi).
167 See generally Albright, supra note 152, at 385 (stating courts favor broad
jurisdictional rules that give plaintiffs the opportunity to sue elusive defendants and
sue at home); Richman, supra note 95, at 631 (stating the Supreme Court has indicated
an interest in providing a ready forum for plaintiffs long before it adopted its two-step
(contacts plus fairness) test); William L. Reynolds, The Proper Fortm for a Suit:
Transnational Forum Non Conveniens and Counter-Suit Injunctions in the Federal Courts, 70
TENN. L. REv. 1663, 1722 (1992) (stating a broad jurisdictional doctrine helps to ensure
that defendants will be held liable somewhere).
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non-Florida defendants in their home state.168 The court found that litigating
separate claims in the six different states where the defendants resided would
be a prohibitive burden on the plaintiffs.1 69 "Without doubt, plaintiffs have a
strong interest in obtaining full relief in one forum."1 70
d. "The Interstate Judicial System's Interest in Obtaining Convenient
and Effective Relief"
Courts are concerned with their ability to exercise jurisdiction over all parties
and all issues involved in a dispute. 171 The interstate judicial system benefits
if all parties and issues are joined in one suit, because repetitious, piece-meal
litigation and inconsistent results are alleviated. 72 In Chatham, the case not
only involved six states, the states sat in four different federal circuits - the
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh.173 The court correctly held that if the
plaintiffs were forced to pursue each defendant in its home jurisdiction it would
result in complex and timely litigation in four different circuits.174 This would
lead to piece-meal decisions and would greatly enhance the chance of
inconsistent judgments.175 Moreover, the court found that multiple
pronouncements on liability and damages could greatly complicate actual
recovery and the resolution of the contribution claims. 176 Judicial efficiency
dictated that the resolution of the claims be determined in one action, in one
forum, in Florida.177
e. "The Shared Interest of the Several States"
The Supreme Court has held that courts should evaluate the shared interest
of the several states in furthering substantive social policies prior to the exercise
of personal jurisdiction.178 Yet, the Supreme Court has neither taken the
168Chatham, 858 F. Supp. at 1149.
1691d. (In addition to numerous defendants in Florida, the case involved defendants
from Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, Tennessee, and South Carolina).
170Id.
171 See Richman, supra note 95, at 633. See also Leslie W. Abramson, Clarifying "Fair
Play and Substantial Justice": How the Courts Apply the Supreme Court Standard for Personal
Jurisdiction, 18 HASTINGS CoNsT. L.Q. 441,444-69 (for an expanded analysis detailing the
five factors courts utilize in determining "fairness").
172Chatham, 858 F. Supp. at 1149.
173Id.
174Id.
1751d.
176Id.
177 Chatham, 858 F. Supp. at 1149.
178Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477.
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opportunity to explain what this means nor explained why it is even relevant
prior to a determination of personal jurisdiction. 179 The Chatham court did not
shed any light on the subject.
Undaunted by Supreme Court's obfuscatory language, the court merely
analyzed the case in light of this factor and miraculously found that exercising
jurisdiction over the defendant would further the social policies. 18° The court
found that the treatment and disposal of hazardous waste is a national industry
involving waste brokers and middlemen shipping hazardous wastes across
state lines on a regular basis. 181 The court went on to hold (without
explanation) that the interposition of jurisdictional defenses would frustrate
the remedial goals of CERCLA.182 Therefore, the shared interest of the states
of this nation supported exercising jurisdiction over the defendant. 183
The Chatham court's reasoning in this instance is non sequitur. First, the court
failed to explain precisely what it was testing when it evaluated "the shared
interest of the several states in furthering the fundamental substantive social
policies." Second, the court did not explain why this test is important in
establishing jurisdiction. Hence, the Chatham court was reduced to post hoc
reasoning in order to establish that it was properly complying with the
Supreme Court's nebulous standard of interstate gestalt.
It is possible that the Supreme Court is simply asking federal courts to
determine which forum among several states has the greatest interest in
hearing the case. The language of the Asahi case18 4 certainly supports this type
of analysis. In Asahi, the Court held that a California court could not exercise
jurisdiction over a Japanese component-part manufacturing company because
(inter alia) the interests of Japan ("the several states") in hearing the case
outweighed the interests of California.185 However, this type of test (balancing
competing jurisdictional interests) is redundant since the Court has posited two
other factors that are directly related to this concern.1 86 Reading Asahi, it
appears that the Supreme Court was attempting to intersperse the concepts of
179 See Richman, supra note 95, at 633. See also Jay Conison, What Does Due Process Have
to Do With Jurisdiction, 46 RUTGERS L.R. 1071, 1189 (1994)(discussing Federalism and
sovereignty and the lack of explanation of why these issues are important when
exploring the concept of personal jurisdiction).
180 Chatham, 858 F. Supp. at 1149.
1811d.
1821d.
183Id.
184 Asahi, 480 U.S. at 1034.
185 Id.
186 See supra notes 165 and 170 (respectively) (discussing the state's interest in
adjudicating the complaint and the judicial system's interest in convenient and effective
relief).
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interstate sovereignty and federalism into the concept of "fairness" to the
defendant (with no explanation of its relevance).187
Yet, the language of Worldwide-Wide Volkswagen and Kulkov v. Superior Court
of California, Etc. indicate a different rationale for this factor.18 8 These cases
imply that a court should determine if there is an overriding federal interest,
shared by the several states, that is furthered by allowing the suit to proceed at
the location.1 89 This seems to be the approach that the Chatham court used.190
The court took a perfunctory look at the importance of CERCLA and
determined that the criteria had been met. Although CERCLA is important, the
court should have explained why CERCLA's relative importance (or the lack
thereof) was relevant in determining whether it could exercise personal
jurisdiction over the defendant.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's current personal jurisdiction framework has created a
quagmire of confusing and inconsistent prerequisites for jurisdiction. The tests
the Court utilizes appear to be more like tests for forum non conveniens than
tests for jurisdiction. 19 1 By adopting the bifurcated (minimum
contacts/fairness) test to determine CERCLA jurisdiction, the Chatham court
has essentially created a new defense to CERCLA. Defendants who would have
never challenged the federal court's jurisdiction will leap at the opportunity to
obtain a favorable decision based upon the imprecise contacts/fairness-based
standard.
On the one hand, Chatham represents a perfunctory application of the
International Shoe standard; on the other, it heralds a new defense that will
certainly become more effective in time. The Chatham court strained to find
personal jurisdiction in the case. The court's tortured logic was evident in its
analysis of both "minimum contacts" and "fairness." However, another court,
one not as eager to exercise jurisdiction, may be more reluctant to stretch the
logic of International Shoe as far.
The Chatham court reasoned that the defendant had sufficient contacts with
Florida so that the exercise of personal jurisdiction was proper. However, the
defendant's contacts with the state of Florida were tangential at best. Certainly,
a different court could hold that the contacts were too indirect and too
infrequent to allow the exercise of jurisdiction. Moreover, a different court
187 See Conison, supra note 179, at 1189-1192.
188 See World-wide Volkswagen 444 U.S. at 292-293; Kulko v. Superior Court Of
California, Etc., 436 U.S. 84, 93 and 98 (1978). See also Richman, supra note 95, at 606
(contending that the Supreme Court relied upon the notion of interstate federalism in
deciding World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson).
189/d.
190Chatham, 858 F. Supp. at 1149.
19 1See generally Albright, supra note 152 (arguing that the fairness doctrine may be
seen as an attempt to constitutionalize the doctrine forum non conveniens).
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could easily find that the defendant could not reasonably anticipate being haled
into a Florida federal court for violations of CERCLA since CERCLA did not
exist at the time the alleged violations took place. Additionally, it would be
perfectly logical for a court to hold that the defendant could not reasonably
anticipate being haled into a federal district court in Florida for improper
treatment and/or disposal of hazardous substances since it never treated or
disposed of any hazardous substances in Florida. It merely sold its product,
scrap batteries.
When analyzing "fairness," the court basically ignored the burden to the
defendant. A different court using a different logic could have held that the
burden on the defendant in trying a major hazardous waste case in Florida
exceeded the other countervailing interests. It does not really stretch the
imagination to visualize a CERCLA defendant who could meet the minimum
contact criteria and still sucessfully challenge a federal court's jurisdiction. In
Asahi, the Supreme Court stated that normally, once minimum contacts have
been established, the interest of the plaintiff and the forum will justify the
exercise of jurisdiction even if the defendant is seriously burdened. 192
However, the Court, in Asahi, balanced the defendant's burden against the
interests of the plaintiff and the state and found for the defendant. Although
Asahi could be distinguished on its facts,193 the defendant's contacts with the
forum state are no less attenuated in Chatham. Using the Asahi precedent, a
different court could dismiss the Chatham case for lack of jurisdiction.
The uncertainties, ambiguities, and inconsistencies associated with the
jurisdictional analysis established by the Supreme Court make an already
confusing field of law (environmental law) more confusing. The Chatham
decision is not notable for what the court held, but rather for what it could have
held. The same court, analyzing the facts in a slightly different manner, could
have held that there were insufficient contacts for the exercise of personal
jurisdiction or the exercise of jurisdiction (in this case) would be unfair. Chatham
can be seen as presaging a new era of environmental defense. Instead of arguing
lack of liability in CERCLA cases, defendants will argue lack of fairness or
contacts.
If the Supreme Court expects these principles to be applied in a rational,
coherent and consistent fashion, the Court must provide at least a modicum of
guidance to the courts. The current test is much too fluid for CERCLA cases. It
robs both the defendant and the plaintiff of predictability and certainty in a
field of law already replete with uncertainty and unpredictability. Without
immediate guidance, it is very possible that the nationwide remedial goals of
CERCLA will be irreparably damaged and parties will spend more time
litigating over the proper forum than actually cleaning contaminated sites.
192 Asahi, 480 U.S. at 1033.
193 The defendant in the case was a Japanese corporation.
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